Inaugural lecture: Beyond Transition: Systems of Innovation, and Growth Perspectives in Eastern Europe by RADOSEVIC, S
 
BEYOND TRANSITION:  
 
SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION, AND GROWTH 
PERSPECTIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE 
 
 
 
Prof. Slavo Radosevic 
 
 
 
University College London 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
 
 
Inaugural lecture, November 15, 20071 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Transition:
systems of innovation and perspectives 
on growth in Eastern Europe
Prof. Slavo Radosevic
SSEES
Inaugural lecture, November 15, 2007 
 
                                                 
1 This is an edited version of the transcript of my professorial lecture. The content is 
substantially the same with the addition of references. I am grateful to Cynthia Little for 
editing assistance. 
1 
 
 
 
This is a very exciting moment for me. Those that know me, know that I normally do 
not have a problem presenting, but I do have a problem speaking in front of so many 
people that I know so well: I feel it a great responsibility. So, for the first time I admit 
to being a bit stressed.  
 
Before I start I want to express my gratitude to David Dyker and Baroness Margaret 
Sharp for giving me opportunity to work in UK; if it had not been for them probably I 
would not be here today. I am enjoying my time at UCL and SSEES, and I am very 
pleased to see you all here this evening. 
 
This is one of those occasions when one has to show what one has been doing all this 
time. I have tried to prepare something that is perhaps rather ambitious, but I will try 
to present it as a kind of story. So, my story is about my perspective on growth in 
Eastern Europe (EE). So, what is the rationale or motivation for this story? It is the 
fact that the economies of all EE countries are now growing.  
 
 
 
Underlying rationale: Is this spurt* in growth 
or catching-up?
* Spurts are periods of medium-term high growth rates which surpass historical rates of growth of 
individual countries but which are not sustainable in the long term. 
 
 
This first slide shows all these countries coming out of transition recession and 
growing at 3 to 8 per cent annually. And, the question that underpins my lecture today 
is what is the basis of this growth? Is it a kind of growth spurt or is it a catching-up. 
What is a growth spurt? Growth spurts are those periods of medium term, high growth, 
when a country grows much above its historical rate, but at a rate that is not 
sustainable in the long term. 2  So my question is whether this growth in EE is 
sustainable? What is the basis of this growth? The argument and the perspective that I 
will employ, have something to say about this.  
 
                                                 
2 For further clarification see Hausman, R., Pritchett, L. and Rodrik, D. (2004) ‘Growth 
Accelerations’ Research Working Paper Series 10566, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic. 
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3An outline
1. System of innovation as an approach to understand 
growth in EE and alternative options
2. System of innovation perspective applied
1. Reconstitution of enterprises (organisational capabilities) 
2. Restructuring of R&D system and knowledge base 
3. Restructuring of ‘broad’ NIS
4. Integration into global industrial networks
3. Political economy of technical modernization 
(control/power issues): domestic vs. foreign led 
modernization
4. Conclusions and policy issues
 
As you see from the outline of my presentation I will first try to explain my own 
perspective, which has been the basis of my work for the last 15 years. I try to explain 
it and put it in the context of the two perspectives used by economists. I will try to 
apply this to the context of EE and analyse their growth from different angles. And 
then, because this approach is short on political aspects I will add to it a political 
economy perspective which I think enriches our understanding of the economy. And, 
as I always want my research to be useful, I will try to draw some policy implications 
from the analysis. 
 
So, let me first explain what is a system of innovation. You might call it a system of 
technological accumulation, but system of innovation is the expression in common 
use. A political economist such as Robert Gilpin, 3  would say that the national 
innovation system is an important aspect of the national political economy – as are the 
financial system, the production system and the political system; the technological 
system is one aspect of the political economy of a country. A Swedish colleague, 
Charles Edquist, would define a system of innovation as ‘all important economic, 
social, political and organizational, institutional, and other factors that influence the 
development, diffusion and use of innovation’.4 Well, this tells me something, but it is 
a very rough definition. Probably the best known definition in the literature is from 
the guru in our area, Chris Freeman, who unfortunately is unable to be here tonight. 
Chris Freeman, based on his work on Japan, coined the term national innovation 
system. So he says the national innovation system, which he defines as ‘the network 
of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions 
initiate, import and diffuse new technologies’, 5  and this has become a kind of 
accepted definition. Nevertheless, there is a lot of disagreement about how to define 
system of innovation, and I myself have written about it,.6 but for today’s lecture, I 
                                                 
3 Gilpin, R. (2001) Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
4 Edquist, C. and Johnson, B. (1997). ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of 
Innovation’, in C. Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and 
Organizations, London and Washington: Pinter/Cassell Academic, page nos. 
5 Freeman, C. (1987) Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, 
London: Pinter. 
6  Radosevic, S. (1998) ‘Defining Systems of Innovation: A Methodological Discussion’, 
Technology in Society 20: 75-86. 
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think Chris Freeman’s definition will work. 
 
4
What is system of innovation (system of 
technology accumulation)? 
• NIS - important aspect of a particular nation’s political 
economy (Gilpin, 2001)
• SI = ‘all important economic, social, political and 
organizational, institutional, and other factors that influence 
the development diffusion, and use of innovation’ (Edquist, 
2006)
• NIS: 'The network of institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import 
and diffuse new technologies' (Freeman, 1987)
• ‘Narrow’ (organisations) vs. ‘Broad’ (institutions) NIS
 
 
Within this definition, we can distinguish between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ NIS. 
‘Narrow’ NIS are all organizations that are explicitly in charge of producing new 
knowledge and using that knowledge, e.g. universities or R&D institutes. What 
constitutes a ‘broad’ NIS? Well, think about tax systems –tax systems generally are 
not designed in order to promote technology; they are designed to collect money for 
the budget. But they have an effect on the innovation activities of enterprises through 
the treatment of gross fixed capital formation or investments in knowledge. And there 
are other aspects of society that have an effect on knowledge generation, utilization 
and diffusion. For example, think of labour relations and the effects of very flexible 
labour markets on the range of skills, compared to those of rigid labour markets. In 
the first case we have external flexibility and a specialized labour force; in the latter 
case we have internal (intra-firm) flexibility and a broadly skilled labour force. They 
have very different effects on knowledge diffusion and how innovation develops at 
firm level. Such examples suggest that almost all societal subsystems have indirect 
effects on how knowledge is generated, utilized and diffused in the economy. So, we 
call this a ‘broad’ NIS although we are aware that there are no clear boundaries to this 
system. 
 
In the last 20 years (since the end of the 1980s) the dominant perspective among 
economists for studying growth in the EE countries has been the so called ‘transition 
economics’ perspective7. Obviously this is not what I am talking about; so I need to 
explain where I stand in relation to the transition perspective. 
 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive overview seeL Mickiewicz,T. (2005), Economic Transition in Central 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States,Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
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5Transition perspective: deficiency and 
departures
• ‘The advice to EECs was based on economics as the 
theory of markets which completely ignores the 
organizational side of the economy’ (Ellerman, 2001).
• Organizations are more then mere players in a game to 
allocate resources efficiently (Moran and Goshal, 1999) - > 
organizational economics (Simon, 1991) 
• Progress towards benchmark > growth
• New Comparative Economics: “economic and social 
change in each country should be considered in light of its 
own institutional possibilities, rather than some idealized 
view of perfect law and order.” (Djankov, La Porta and Schleifer 
2003) > variety of NIS
 
 
 
As David Ellerman, an American economist pointed out: ‘The advice to EE countries 
was based on economics as the theory of markets which completely ignores the 
organizational side of the economy’,8 and indeed, when you look at the underlying 
assumptions of ‘economics of transition’ they are largely about markets. Well, is that 
a sufficient or realistic representation not only of transition economies but of 
economies in general? Two respected scholars, one of them no longer alive, Moran 
and Ghoshal, argue that organizations are ‘not just players in a game to allocate 
resources efficiently’.9 Organizations are important players in the market economy, 
therefore, a theory of a market economy has to include the theory of organizations. 
And here I want to refer to Herbert Simon, Nobel prize winning economist, who has a 
nice story.10 He said imagine that a Martian comes to Earth, and he takes a telescope 
and looks at it through to see what kind of economics Earthlings have. So, what does 
he see? Oh, he sees that there are some big green spots, and these are organizations, 
enterprises. And then he sees blue coloured lines which are the transactions taking 
place within the organizations, and they are very dense. He sees red lines connecting 
organizations, which are the market transactions. So, this is an Earthling’s economy? 
Yes. So how could I describe such an economy where there are so many blue lines or 
transactions within organizations? I will call it organizational economics.  
 
Obviously this perspective is somewhat different from a perspective that looks at 
economies only in terms of the market. And, because I am looking at growth from the 
innovation perspective organizations are very important and must be integral to my 
perspective.   
 
The second distinction between ‘transition economics’ and the perspective that I want 
to apply here is in how we see the relationship between institutions and growth? From 
a comparative economics perspective, growth could be assessed based on the distance 
of countries from the benchmark. What do we use as the benchmark? The benchmark 
                                                 
8 Ellerman, 2001, Email communication  
9 Moran, P. and Ghoshal, S. (1999) ‘Markets, Firms, and the Process of Economic 
Development’, The Academy of Management Review, 24(3): 390-412. 
10 Simon, H.A. (1991) ‘Organizations and Markets’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
5(2): 25-44. 
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is an imaginary economy, ‘an open market economy’, that has a certain set of 
institutional features. Here we can refer to the conceptual model depicted in the 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) transition indicators, 
where we can trace 27 post-socialist economies in terms of how far away they are 
from this ideal model. 11  So we have a best practice model and we can trace 
institutional changes in these countries. The logic is that their growth will be closely 
related to the distance from the best practice. The closer a country is to the best 
practice the better we would expect its preconditions for long-term growth to be.  
 
This model was used during the 1990s and early 2000s to explain differential growth 
rates across transition economies. At the same time, we are in the period when 
‘transition economics’ is being questioned, and especially in terms of the questions 
about comparative economics. And here I would like to quote a group of economists 
who were very much involved in ‘transition economics’ and who, after all this 
experience over 15-20 years, arrived at an understanding that is summarized in this 
quote: ‘Economic and social change in each country should be considered in the light 
of its own institutional possibilities, rather than some idealized view of perfect law 
and order’ (Djankov, La Porta and Schleifer, 2003)12 (emphasis added). Now this is 
radically different from the first assumption that says ‘I know what the benchmark is 
and I know how far we are from the benchmark’. But why is this new position 
important for me? It is because it is a different philosophical point and it allows for 
something that is impossible in the first assumption: it allows for a variety of national 
innovation systems, which means that there are different innovation systems that can 
be equally conducive to growth. And there is no one best practice model. So, this 
assumption serves me as a point of departure. It is one kind of perspective that I could 
use, but I also want to show you the problems in using this perspective.  
 
6
Problems with traditional growth theory based on 
production function
• Aggregate view of growth  Y= A(K,L)
• What A may contain: technology (LBD), lower costs 
(LBD), externalities, sectoral composition, … (Easterly and 
Levine, 2001)
• Technology as a black box
• Technology is not a simple process of conversion of 
inputs into outputs … but, the process also operates in 
reverse
• It considers TP as solely driven from the supply side, 
neglect of demand side
• Etc…….
 
 
                                                 
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (various years) Transition Report, 
EBRD, London. 
12 Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2003) ‘The New 
Comparative Economics’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 595-619. 
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The other perspective that I could use is traditional growth theory, which is based on 
the production function. In a nutshell, this model explains economic growth based on 
investments in capital (K) and labour (L) i.e. I am trying to explain growth through 
factors, but obviously not all growth can be explained by factors, part of it is 
unexplained and is represented by the residual (A). It misleadingly referred to as total 
factor productivity (TFP) or as some economists describe it as a ‘black box’ 
(Rosenberg) or ‘a measure of our ignorance’ (Abramovitz). 
 
So what is it that is left out of the model and is represented by the residual? This is 
important for me as it may have something to do with technology. Two very respected 
economists, William Easterly and Levine, 13  reviewed literature that tries to 
understand what the residual actually includes. They list a variety of things such as 
technology and lower costs, which emerge through learning by doing, various 
externalities or spillovers, sectoral composition, etc., etc. In other words, we are very 
unsure as to what A contains. However, Easterly and Levine emphasise how 
important it is to find out what determines A. And I am one of those who try to work 
within that A if you like, or within this black box. And I cannot take an aggregate 
view of technology because it does not tell me much. In fact, knowing the share of A 
is not very relevant for policy making. But I do want to understand what is in that 
black box. So, I am not satisfied by an aggregate figure and an aggregate view of the 
growth. In a way, I am trying to show you the limitations of these two alternatives and 
why I am in favour of yet another track. There are numerous other objections to this 
other approach, some of which are highlighted on the slide; however, I do not want to 
deviate too much from my main line of my argument. 
                                                
 
So, I position myself in relation to the dominant views on technology and growth and 
I make it clear that I take the systems of innovation approach to growth. So, an 
important question arises: where does this approach stand in terms of micro, meso, 
macro criteria?  
 
13  Easterly W. and R. and Levine (2001) ‘It's Not Factor Accumulation, What have we learned 
from a decade of empirical research on growth?’ World Bank Economic Review 15: 177-
219. 
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7System of innovation approach to growth:
micro - mezzo – macro levels
1. Firms: repositories of capabilities and arena of governance
The firm is not only key repository of organisational capabilities but 
also ‘the original, most important point of permeable contact between 
state and society’ (Seleny, 2006, p. 130) i.e. the key political economy 
unit and reflection of state – society governance
2. SI’s production theory: interactive dynamic capabilities 
approach (von Tunzelmann and Wang, 2007)
External sources of knowledge play a major role in the accumulation 
of the stock of knowledge of firms (Malerba, 1992; see taxonomy)
3. NIS emerges in mutual interaction of different subsystems
(Freeman) (science, technology, business, market, finance, foreign 
trade, government,  culture, etc)
>  it is co-evolutionary process where major mechanism is not tendency 
towards equilibrium but (mis)matching between different subsystems
- ‘when it rains, it pours: all factors flow in the same direction’ (Easterly & 
Levine, 2001) > complementarities
 
 
Well, unfortunately it encompasses all three levels, which may be good thing, but 
makes for a very complicated methodological problem. We start from the importance 
of organizations or firms. Firms in this approach are repositories of capabilities, but 
where do these capabilities reside? They reside in part in individuals’ knowledge, but 
we can often produce something only in cooperation with other people, i.e. in a group 
- and then groups of people can produce much more. So the nature of capabilities is 
that they are a collective phenomenon. At the same time, firms are arenas of 
governance. They are organizations embodying all the political and institutional 
features of the society and the economy. They are a political economic unit of the 
economy in which the type of market system and the firm level governance system 
affect the nature of capabilities: it is this that I shall try to demonstrate in the context 
of the EE14.  
 
So firms are essential agents in this perspective. Next, what is the production theory in 
this perspective on growth? Firms are important in this perspective, but external 
sources of knowledge also play a major role in the accumulation of the stock of 
knowledge of firms. 15  So firms operate in a broader institutional and knowledge 
context - what is that context? 
 
 
                                                 
14 Seleny Anna (2006) The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and 
Poland. From Communism to the European Union, Cambridge University Press, NY 
15 Malerba, F. (1992) ‘Learning by Firms and Incremental Technical Change’, Economic 
Journal 102: 845-859. 
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8Interactive dynamic capabilities approach (von 
Tunzelmann and Wang, 2007): opening the black box
Competencies - a potential for growth enhancement >?=> Capabilities –
harnessing competencies effectively
Interactive - producing products that are compatible with the capabilities of 
customers’ needs and suppliers’ knowledge
Dynamic - reproducible in ‘real time’ i.e. they are changing. 
TC depends on a variety of learning mechanisms: upstream, downstream 
and laterally ’
Source Internal External
From production Learning by doing Learning by spillovers
from competitors and from 
horizontal linkages
From consumption Learning by using
products, inputs, mach. 
Learning by interacting
with suppliers and buyers
From technology 
suppliers
Learning from R&D 
and training
Learning from education 
and /S&T of 
‘technology/ knowledge
suppliers’
 
 
The above slide suggests one of ways we can think of firms and their broader context 
in terms of learning. Why learning? Well, learning is the key process through which 
firms and organizations in general, develop and interact. Learning is essential to the 
generation and utilization of technology.  
 
The approach that I find inspiring was developed by my colleagues Nick von 
Tunzelmann and Qing Wang16 and builds on the work of Franco Malerba.17 Let me 
explain why Nick and Qing call it the ‘interactive dynamic capabilities approach’. 
First, learning can take place within firms, usually described by economists as 
‘learning by doing’, the idea being that the more I produce the more I learn. And very 
often this learning is described wrongly as costless: it is not. Second there is ‘learning 
by using’ products, inputs, machinery. We learn as producers and users, but we learn 
also as a result of conscious undertaking of R&D and training. So, this is active 
learning within enterprises, as opposed to learning by doing and learning by using, 
which can be considered examples of passive learning. Equally important is the 
learning that takes place outside of firm, i.e. through interactions with external actors. 
One of these types of learning is ‘learning by spillovers’. Companies learn from 
competitors or from companies with which they have horizontal linkages. Companies 
learn by interacting with suppliers and buyers, and the depth of the learning from 
these sources depends on the depth of the suppliers’ and buyers’ learning. And 
companies learn through education and science and technology; they learn from 
universities, from R&D organizations, from sellers of patents and licences, and so on. 
So within this perspective a system that is conducive to a variety of learning 
mechanisms, which, in turn, generate more advanced technological capabilities, is 
more likely to generate long-term growth. That sounds logical, which is why, in this 
approach which is a kind of basis of this perspective, learning is interactive. It is a 
                                                 
16 von Tunzelmann, N. and Wang, Q. (2007) ‘Capabilities and Production Theory’, Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics, 18: 192-211. 
17 ibid. 
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social process which occurs within organizations, but also, and equally importantly, 
across organizations and with other organizations. 
 
Why are we talking about capabilities? Well we need to distinguish between 
competencies and capabilities. Essentially EE is a region where, relative to the level 
of national income the labour force has a high level of education, i.e. better 
competences. For example, statistics for Lithuania and Estonia show that 40% of the 
population have university degrees. So do these people have competencies? Perhaps 
they do. Do they have capabilities? Well we don’t know. Probably they have fewer 
capabilities because capabilities arise only when competences are harnessed 
effectively. Competencies or knowledge are not automatically converted into 
capabilities or on-the-job skills. Capabilities are most often firm specific and can be 
developed only within a specific organizational context. And this is something that 
requires learning organizations, market pressures but also mechanisms for knowledge 
sharing and various market and non-market incentives.  
 
Finally, why is this a dynamic approach? It is dynamic because the capabilities have 
to be reproducible in time through organizational routines. Also, in a market context 
capabilities have to be continuously adjusted and improved to meet new consumer 
requirements. And growing organizations need to develop mechanisms that will allow 
them to improve and add new capabilities. Thus, within this perspective technological 
change depends on a variety of learning mechanisms, that go upstream, downstream 
and laterally. This is the reason for our description of ‘system of innovation’, because 
technology is also systemic. 
 
And my third point is how does a successful national innovation system emerge? It 
emerges through the mutual interaction of different subsystems. This explanation 
again refs to Christopher Freeman’s investigation of the British industrial revolution 
where he finds that good complementarity between different social subsystems 
generated the dynamism that led to a profound change in the whole economy.18 So in 
this context, what matters are the co evolutionary mechanisms, how these systems 
coevolved, and how the complementarities between the education, science, business 
and foreign trade systems evolved and changed one another. And how ultimately 
these mutual complementarities produced economic development. This thinking, 
which is based on the idea of complementarity, is not just the thinking of a neo-
Schumpeterian economist. Again, I refer to Easterly and Levine (2001)19 who, when 
referring to catch-up said, ‘when it rains, it pours; all factors flow in the same 
direction’, because growth does not happen every day – but when it does happen it 
comes in a deluge, it ‘pours’, as any traveller to contemporary China can confirm. 
And when does it pour? When you have so many mutually reinforcing 
complementarities between different societal sub-systems including external 
environment that they jointly generate catch up 
 
                                                 
18 Freeman C. (2002) ‘Continental, National and Sub-national Innovation Systems—
Complementarity and Economic Growth’, Research Policy 31: 191–211. 
19 ibid. 
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Reconstitution of enterprises 
(organisational capabilities)
 
 
So these are three perspectives on growth, and three levels of systems of innovation, 
which is the perspective on growth that I will try to apply in relation to EE. We will 
start from the micro level, at the level of the enterprise, and from organizational 
capabilities. And we start with Socialism because that is a legacy, the legacy being 
that the Soviet enterprise was not a ‘normal’ enterprise. If you want to define it, you 
could describe it as a production unit with ‘dislocated’ business functions. Why? 
Because marketing was the responsibility of foreign trade organizations; finance was 
job of the ministry of finance; the strategic function was the responsibility of the 
ministry of planning; R&D was dislocated to branch institutes, etc. So we have a 
strange animal that needs to restructure and bring all these functions under one roof. 
This is not so easy because the functions of the enterprise were distributed across a 
hierarchy; thus, the phrase USSR Inc. captures this well. So, the problem is to put all 
these functions together: the legacy of socialism is weak, firm specific organizational 
capabilities. This is the starting point to the systemic problem of how to transform 
production units into business units or business organizations.  
 
10
Legacy of socialism
• The Soviet enterprise = production units with 
'dislocated business functions' 
– Cf. Governance affects nature of capabilities
• Innovation process planned across hierarchy
• In socialism organizational learning was limited 
as there was not opportunity for strategic, 
functional, hierarchical integration > legacy of 
weak firm specific organisational capabilities
• Post-socialist enterprise => business units
 
 
In order to illustrate how this legacy operates across different EE countries I have 
taken the next slide from a paper coauthored with, Djuro Kutlaca, that looked at 
11 
 
patenting activity in EE and the US.20 We looked at who in EE was patenting. But, 
why this interest? Well, if enterprises were patenting this would mean that enterprises 
were active in innovation and one of my explanations would be inaccurate. But if 
enterprises were not patenting this would mean that they were not agents in the 
innovation process, which would mean that they were not part of a market economy. 
Our comparisons revealed various things. 
 
11
Differences in inherited organisational capabilities …. the extent 
to which firms were agents of innovation
Foreign US patents by institutional sectors, 1969-1994
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This slide shows that Hungary had the largest share of patents from enterprises. In the 
case of ex-Yugoslavia, both enterprises and foreigners were patentors. In Romania the 
Ministry was registering patents in the US. In USSR the major patentors were 
industrial (branch) institutes and the Academy of Sciences. So the historical legacy 
operated to very different degrees across countries. In some cases, enterprises were 
the key agents; in others they played a marginal role. So, the starting positions are 
very different in terms of enterprises reconstituting as business entities. And this 
applies just to this one function. I wont complicate things more - but hope that the 
point has been made. 
 
So we have a situation where enterprises have to be reconstituted, and have to be 
reconstituted as business entities, which involves some challenges. The first challenge 
is that any production and continuous improvement to one product requires the 
integration of various functions - finance, R&D, engineering, procurement, 
production and sales. I would describe this challenge as ‘system integration at product 
level’ as it is only when these functions are brought together into a coherent 
organization that we can achieve something that is marketable.21  
 
 
                                                 
20 Kutlaca, D. and Radosevic, S. (1999) ‘Technological “Catching-up” Potential of Central and 
Eastern Europe: An Analysis Based on US Foreign Patenting Data’, Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 11(1): 95-111. 
21 See Radosevic. S. (1999) 'Transformation of S&T Systems into Systems of Innovation in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Emerging Patterns of Recombination, Path-dependency 
and Change', Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10: 277-320. 
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The reconstitution of enterprises and 
production networks in post-socialism: key 
challenges
System integration at product level =
• production and continuous improvement require 
integration of different functions (finance, R&D, 
engineering, procurement, production, sale) whose 
integration is essential to innovation dynamics. 
Process integration at firm level =
• production and innovation have to be organised across 
several tiers of suppliers which are all involved to different 
degrees, not only in production, but also in innovation.
 
 
The second challenge I call ‘process integration at firm level’ – which is what? Well, 
if you are producing a car you have a lot of suppliers – first tier, second and third tier - 
sometimes several hundreds of suppliers. They need to be managed; a supplier 
network is required for countries to produce a complex product. So a key challenge is 
how can companies build such a network, i.e. integrate the activities of large numbers 
of buyers and suppliers with their own production activities. The next slide shows 
areas of upgrading, and the challenges that arise in this process and the progress made 
by EE. This is based on case studies conducted with colleagues, or projects in which I 
was the coordinator or a partner.22   
 
13
Areas of upgrading of the CEE firms
• The upgrading of the CEE firms has been primarily 
functional > (production capability – quality), not 
discernable upgrading towards R&D and export 
marketing > the divorce between technology and 
production capability.
• The capabilities to integrate the system at product level 
(combining foreign with domestic solutions, 
customisation, etc.) and organise a network at firm level 
(manage domestic subcontractors) are still weak. 
Weakness Area of upgrading 
Marketing skills, finance, organization Managerial/functional upgrading 
Product systems integration capabilities Product upgrading 
Network building capabilities at firm level Process upgrading esp. ‘linkage capabilities’ 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 See McGowan F., Radosevic S. and von Tunzelmann N. (eds) (2004) The Emerging 
Industrial Structure of the Wider Europe, London: Routledge and Radosevic, S. and 
Sadowski B. (eds) (2004) International Industrial Networks and Industrial Restructuring 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
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The case studies showed that upgrading primarily has been functional, which means 
that it has been confined to primary functions within enterprises. The most important 
improvements at enterprise level involve the production capabilities, i.e. the ability to 
produce at world level in terms of quality. Typically, companies will export via 
intermediaries, and will have quite well developed local marketing skills but no 
export abilities. They probably market under their own brand names but do not do 
products that are new to the world. So, we most often find a situation of good local 
production units, but no technology capabilities and weak linkage and networking 
capabilities. However, this is not unique to EE : companies from so called emerging 
markets have similar problems and face high barriers to entry to non-production parts 
of the value chain. However, what is specific to EE is enterprises that have become 
good producers in terms of their production capabilities, but whose other functions 
(networking, linkages, non-production functions) are still very much the same as in 
socialist times. In my view, the very weak firm specific capabilities that EE inherited 
from socialism have not improved significantly. Moreover, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is most often confined to production activities which further reinforces this 
structural problem.   
 
So, what can weak local enterprises do? They are turning to the local environment to 
compensate for their own weaknesses and they are trying to rely on sources of 
knowledge outside the country.  
14
Sources of information for innovation (very important) in % of 
enterprises
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Weak firms compensate for their weaknesses by 
greater reliance on NIS
 
 
This slide shows data taken from the third European Innovation Survey for the ‘old 
EU-15’ and averages for five of the EE countries. It is based on questions to 
enterprises: What is the main source of innovation for your enterprise? Is it based on 
your own enterprise, or is it information acquired from your competitors because you 
have seen some good things that they are doing? Is it from partners in the value chain 
i.e. from your suppliers and buyers, or from social networks (trade exhibitions, which 
are very important sources, journals, engineering associations), or is it from external 
knowledge organizations, e.g. R&D institutes and universities. We can see that in the 
EU-15, the enterprise’s own knowledge is a much more important source of 
information than in the EE. Also competitors play a much more important role which 
indicates the importance of invisible links among competitors. But, reliance on other 
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external organizations, on suppliers, buyers, engineering associations, trade fairs, 
universities is much more important for EE countries than for the EU-15. Although 
the difference is not huge it suggests, nevertheless, that EE firms are trying to 
compensate for weak firm capabilities by relying on the other actors in the innovation 
system. Therefore, the development of that system is very important: how it 
developed, how well developed it is. 
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Towards post-socialist innovation system
• Socialism = firms could not rely on external learning 
mechanisms . … the absence of the division of labor in the 
market (Kogut and Zander, 1999) =>absence of learning by 
interacting
• Poverty of business strategies in socialism (Yudanov, 1997).
• Anti-innovative bias of socialism is caused by the 
organizational singularity 
• Firms were insufficiently specialized in the context of the 
diversity that constitutes the market.
• This is Schumpeterian/evolutionary interpretation
vs. distorted incentives and allocative inefficiencies
interpretations
 
 
So we are talking now about a process - where the whole innovation system has to 
change its nature. We are moving from a single enterprise towards an enterprise 
environment. Why is this problematic? It is a problem for socialist firms because they 
cannot rely on external learning mechanisms.23 The good firms under socialism were 
those that remained outside the socialist environment because they had learned to 
overcome their problems by themselves and were not exposed to the hazards of a 
centrally planned system. The socialist system was impoverished in terms of the 
variety of business strategies: it had only one kind of strategy – large volume 
production. And the system was biased against innovation because there was only one 
type of firm – there was a kind of organizational singularity. What was missing was 
something that is essential for markets – a variety of sources of knowledge and 
strategies, and mechanisms through which enterprises interact. All of these were 
missing, which meant that firms were insufficiently specialized. So, now EE are faced 
with the emergence of a new system. Obviously, I am explaining the problems of 
socialism from a Schumpeterian and evolutionary perspective rather than from a 
mainstream perspective, which would be concerned primarily with the incentives and 
allocative distortions in socialism.  
                                                 
23 Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (2000) ‘Did Socialism Fail to Innovate? A natural experiment of 
the two Zeiss companies’, American Sociological Review 65(Apr.): 169-90. 
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How an ‘extended order’ emerges ?
• A new extended order built on entrepreneurial firms …
• …. an emerging variety of types of firms and of 
strategies: Volume strategy, Niche strategy, Customized strategy, 
Innovative (pioneering) strategy, Specialized suppliers
• …..whose evolution is simultaneously linked to the 
development of an ‘extended order’ (Kogut and Zander, 
1999) i.e. NIS 
• ‘The narrow NIS almost everywhere are "hybrid" 
systems embodying complex public/private 
interdependencies (Nelson, 1996). (…) Consequently 
the governments of Eastern Europe are having to learn 
how to manage these hybrid systems….’ (Freeman, 
2006)
 
So the question now is how will this new system emerge? What will be the basis of 
this market system? Obviously an extended order, a new kind of innovation system 
will be based on entrepreneurial firms. Similar to any other market system, we are 
observing an emerging variety of types of firms and enterprises, which are adopting 
different types of strategies. What these enterprises do will depend to a large extent on 
the innovation system, the kind of infrastructure, the kind of market and the 
institutional support in their immediate environment. Firms operate in an innovation 
system that has elements of public and private, some of which are created entirely by 
the market, and others by public institutions and the state. What is most important is 
that these countries have to learn how to manage these systems. Since they are by 
definition hybrid systems, this is not easy because the dominant political economy 
philosophy, at least during the 1990s and early 2000, favoured only market based 
institutional solutions and was undermining the role of the state in the innovation 
system. 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring of R&D system and 
knowledge base
 
 
We now move to the second layer, to the broader issue of the R&D system, which is 
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the system that should contribute to the dynamism and innovation of the economy. In 
this context we have different types of R&D systems: they can be focused primarily 
on the enterprise because it is business that is doing the R&D or they can be 
government or higher education R&D. The next slide shows several models in terms 
of the R&D sector that is predominant either as a funding source or for performing the 
R&D, and which countries belong to which model.  
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Different institutional profiles of R&D systems ….
    Dominant performing sector < Dominant source sector
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
BES < BES BES < GOV HES < GOVGOV < GOV GOV < BES
USA Slovakia Portugal Bulgaria Kazakhstan
Ireland Hungary Estonia Azerbaijan
France Poland Lithuania
UK Belarus Turkey
Austria Croatia
Belgium Russia
Finland Romania
Germany
Spain
Korea (Rep)
Slovenia
Czech R
Latvia
 
So, we can see that among the EE countries only Slovenia, Czech Republic and partly 
Latvia have R&D systems that are based predominantly in the business enterprise 
sector (BES).  
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BES dominated R&D systems are feature of countries above 
$15Kpc
GDP pc 2003
Model 
type
Model 
Dummy
USA 29,037 1 1
Ireland 24,739 1 1
France 21,861 1 1
UK 21,310 1 1
Austria 21,232 1 1
Belgium 21,205 1 1
Finland 20,511 1 1
Germany 19,144 1 1
Spain 17,021 1 1
Korea (Rep) 15,732 1 1
Estonia 14,340 3 0
Slovenia 13,995 1 1
Portugal 13,807 3 0
Czech R 9,905 1 1
Latvia 9,722 1 1
Slovakia 9,392 2 0
Lithuania 7,986 3 0
Hungary 7,947 2 0
Poland 7,674 2 0
Kazakhstan 7,655 5 0
Belarus 7,387 2 0
Croatia 7,233 2 0
Turkey 6,731 3 0
Russian Fed 6,323 2 0
Bulgaria 6,278 4 0
Romania 3,510 2 0
Azerbaijan 3,394 4 0
 
We need to know the relation between these models and the level of development. We 
can see that basically all countries with a per capita GDP over $15K are dominated by 
model 1, i.e. by the BES. Countries with per capita GDP below that level have models 
that are not dominated by BES R&D. So, what kind of structural change should we 
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expect to accompany economic growth? We would expect a shift from government 
owned R&D laboratories to enterprise R&D. So, we are interested in whether and 
how quickly EE enterprises are moving towards an enterprise based R&D system. 
This is in part a developmental but is also in part an institutional issue that is specific 
to post-socialist countries.  
 
The next slide shows the degree of change towards BES as a ratio. Change is the 
difference between the first and the last available data in the UNESCO database, 
which is mainly mid-1990s and early 2000s. We are interested primarily in trends or 
directions of change. The highlighted figures are those sectors where the biggest shifts 
occurred in R&D employment, the biggest structural shift towards BES being in 
China, followed by Slovenia and Czech R. We can see that in Russia the share of BES 
has actually decreased on account of the increased relative share of the government 
sector. In other countries we can see an increase towards the higher education sector. 
Growth should go hand in hand with a rising relative importance of BES – but we do 
not see that happening in many of the EE countries. This tells us that, yes there is 
growth, but as R&D is not shifting towards the business sector the sustainability of 
that growth is questionable.  
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R&D employment: limited re-orientation towards BES 
in EE
Increasing share of BES (China; Slovenia); Increasing shares of BES and HES (Czech R; Hungary, 
Lithuania); Increasing share of government sector (Russia); Increasing share of government and HES 
(Bulgaria); Increasing share of HES (Poland; Romania, Slovakia)
Country Business enterprise Government 
Higher 
education 
Private 
non-profit 
Not 
distributed
China 0.47 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.20
China 0.60 0.23 0.17 0.00
Slovenia 0.42 0.34 0.22 0.03
Slovenia 0.56 0.23 0.18 0.04
Czech Republic 0.48 0.34 0.19 0.00
Czech Republic 0.52 0.26 0.21 0.01
Hungary 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.00
Hungary 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.00
Lithuania 0.03 0.48 0.49 0.00
Lithuania 0.09 0.29 0.62 0.00
Russian Federation 0.64 0.26 0.10 0.00
Russian Federation 0.60 0.30 0.10 0.00
Bulgaria 0.14 0.58 0.27 0.01
Bulgaria 0.14 0.66 0.19 0.00
Poland 0.28 0.25 0.47 0.00
Poland 0.17 0.25 0.58 0.04
Romania 0.71 0.23 0.06 0.00
Romania 0.49 0.30 0.21 0.03
Slovakia 0.32 0.41 0.27 0.00
Slovakia 0.24 0.24 0.51 0.01
 
 
How much R&D systems have changed allows us to guess at how strong a basis they 
have built for long-term growth. We see that R&D systems have not changed much. 
For example, their science specialization did not change much during the 1990s. The 
science of EE countries based on their publications, continues to be focused around 
six areas related to physics and chemistry,24 because these were the dominant areas in 
the 1950s and 1960s when socialist countries were investing considerably in science. 
Changing that specialization is not easy.  
 
However, at the institutional level we see increasing inter-country differences in the 
                                                 
24 See Kozlowski, J., Radosevic S. and Ircha D. (1999) ‘History Matters: The Inherited 
Disciplinary Structure of the Post-Communist Science in countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and its Restructuring’, Scientometrics 45(1): 137-66. 
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institutional R&D landscapes. These differences have emerged from different 
restructuring (active or passive or preservation) policies, and different R&D 
organization micro-strategies.25 The post-socialist period produced a rich supply of 
ingenious survival strategies for R&D institutes, with people inventing and trying to 
find ways to get out of the crisis. The profile of the R&D systems has been shaped by 
the interactions among these micro and macro strategies. I cannot go into this in detail 
here, but would just highlight that there were and are differences across countries.26  
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How much R&D systems have changed? 
• Science base of the ex-socialist countries is (still) 
firmly based on 6 areas around physics and chemistry 
…
• Similar external pressures but big inter-country 
differences
– Policy of active/passive restructuring
– Policy of preservation
– Micro strategies
– An increasingly EU-ized R&D systems in CEE and post-
Soviet R&D systems in CIS 
 
From the macro perspective there is increasing divergence between two systems: an 
increasingly Europeanized or perhaps I should say EU-ized R&D system emerging in 
the new member states from EE, and a post Soviet R&D system. The latter has seen 
little change since socialism, although there are some important differences among 
different post-Soviet countries.27 
 
The story of the post-Soviet R&D system is fascinating. I was privileged to be able to 
observe very closely one of the microcosms of the post Soviet R&D system - 
Novosibirsk Akademgorodok - which represents 20 per cent of the Russian R&D 
system. I would like to tell you more about this, but the time does not allow.28   
                                                 
25 For the case of Russia see: Radosevic S. (2003) ‘Patterns of Preservation, Restructuring and 
Survival: Science and technology policy in Russia in the post-Soviet era’, Research Policy 
32(6): 1105-24. 
26  See Radosevic S. (1996) 'Restructuring of R&D Institutes in Post-Socialist Economies: 
Emerging Patterns and Issues', in A. Webster (ed.) Building New Bases for Innovation: 
The Transformation of the R&D System in Post-Socialist States, Cambridge: Anglia 
Polytechnic University, pp. 8-30; Dyker, A.D. and Radosevic S. (2000) ‘Building the 
Knowledge-based Economy in Countries in Transition - from Concepts to Policies’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 12(1): 41-70 (reprinted in Dyker D.A. (2004) 
Catching Up and Falling Behind. Post-Communist Transformation in Historical 
Perspective, London: Imperial College Press, pp. 252-90). 
27 Radosevic S. (2008) ‘Innovation Systems of Russia and Ukraine in Comparison with 
Innovation Systems of other Countries, in N. Ivanova and I. Yegorov (eds), Russia and 
Ukraine in the Light of Indicators of the European Innovation Trendchart,- Kiev: State 
Committee of Statistics, pp. 70-92 (in Russian). 
28 This represents part of some still unpublished research undertaken in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s in Novosibirsk. For research on another post-Soviet country (Kazkahstan) see 
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Post-Soviet R&D microcosm: Novosibirsk 
Akademgorodok: some lessons
• ‘Blurring boundaries’ organizational forms (quasi spin offs)
• The more insulated RI is from environment the better are 
its chances for survival and growth. 
• Different models of adjustment of RI = f (structural factors -
nature of S&T area) and idiosyncratic (management, 
history).
• The absence of NTBFs in Russia cannot be understood 
within the linear innovation process perspective 
(vnedrenye) ) but only within the interactive innovation 
process perspective
• In institutionally undeveloped environment, the scope for 
technology based growth and competition is extremely 
limited
 
 
 
‘Broad’ NIS
- demand for technology vs. market demand -
 
 
 
Now we move to the system level which is a more complicated area. For example, 
how did systemic changes affect the system of innovation and generation of 
technology? I have looked at the area of ‘broad’ NIS although not very 
systematically.29 Here, I confine myself to a few hints, and to pointing out one of the 
crucial factors for shaping NIS in EE - the issue of demand.30 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Radosevic S. and Myrzakhmet M. (2009) ‘Between Vision and Reality: Promoting 
innovation through technoparks in an emerging economy, Technovation 29(10): 645-56 ,  
29 SeeRadosevic S. (1995) ‘Science and Technology Capabilities in Economies in Transition: 
Effects and Prospects’, The Economics of Transition 3(4): 459-78 and Kutlaca D. and 
Radosevic S. (2006) ‘Macroeconomic Regimes and Changing Cost Structures in Central 
and Eastern Europe’, Acta Oeconomica, Akademia Kiado, Budapest 56(1): 45-70. 
30  See Radosevic S. (2004) ‘(Mis)match between Demand and Supply for Technology: 
Innovation, R&D and growth issues in countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, In Filho 
W.L. (ed.) Supporting the Development of R&D and the Innovation Potential of Post-
Socialist Countries, Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp. 71-82. 
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During the early 2000s many EE economies were growing driven largely by local 
demand. However, in an innovation studies context, this does not mean that these 
economies were automatically generating demand for local R&D and technology. 
Demand for products and services and demand for technology do not equate. To 
illustrate this, the next slide shows figures for Poland and Russia. Here we have two 
economies and their GDP and R&D figures. We can see that the Polish economy 
declines slightly, but then grows; the Russian economy declines much more, but then 
recovers. Ultimately both economies are growing at almost similar rates. But what 
about their investment in R&D (rdgdp)? Here we have Russia, which has invested 
much more, and Poland which has invested much less, but overall R&D expenditures 
are at a relatively similar level although the declines were very different. When the 
economy started to grow we see that the economy in Poland was growing, but R&D 
was stagnating and then going down and in Russia we see that it increased. So what 
was driving all of this? Was there a sudden demand for local R&D in the Russian 
economy, and was this healthy growth? Nothing could be further from the reality. It 
was based simply on government investing more money, making it a largely public 
sector. But what is the basis of Poland’s growth and why is its level of R&D 
declining? 
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Different rates of GDP ... similar rates of GERD/GDP fall ….. Similar rates of GDP ... 
different rates of GERD/GDP recovery
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We have the problem of stagnant demand for technology, which is just a small 
illustration of the problem that demand for technology does not emerge automatically 
with growth and recovery.  
 
I have looked in some depth at the innovation capacity of EE economies. I cannot go 
into too much detail here because of the time. However, I want to highlight that in 
many aspects of innovation capacity there is no East-West division, because there are 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, even Italy in some respects, that have 
similarities with the countries of central Europe. So in this context, I would argue that 
there are three Europes (left hand figure in the slide below). But there is one 
dimension of national innovation capacity where you can see a clear East-West 
division: and this is in relation to the factors that determine demand for innovation. 
These darker shaded bars are EE countries, the others are the old EU-15 countries. 
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How it is composed and the 25 indicators it is based on are too complex for me to 
describe in detail now.31 However, I include it to make the point that in many respects 
these countries have similar problems of deficient demand for innovation which may 
not be generated automatically with economic growth.  
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Demand: the only component of national innovation 
capacity with the pronounced East - West divide
• Three tier Europe
– Absorptive capacity
– R&D capacity
– Diffusion Capacity
• Demand capacity
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To illustrate this further, I want to demonstrate the importance of demand at the micro 
level, which is an area I am working on at the moment.32 Questionnaires have been 
received from 304 New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs) from 5 EE countries 
asking about their main problems and most important barriers in domestic and foreign 
markets? In foreign markets the main barriers are related to marketing and foreign 
competition. In the domestic market, the biggest problems are limited market demand 
and high costs of labour. Note that the firms are NTBFs, not ordinary firms.  
 
                                                 
31 See Radosevic S. (2004) ‘A Two-Tier or Multi-Tier Europe? Assessing the Innovation 
Capacities of Central and East European Countries in the Enlarged EU', Journal of 
Common Market Studies 42(3): 641-66. 
32 Radošević S., Savić M. and Woodward R. (2008) ‘Knowledge-Based Entrepreneurship in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Myth and Reality’, Working Paper No. 93 (November). 
available at http://www.ssees.ac.uk/wp93sum.htm. 
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High and medium barriers on domestic and foreign markets, all 
countries
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Then, in another project on software firms, we surveyed 224 software firms in 5 
countries about the quality of their demand from local and from foreign buyers.33 We 
asked which was more demanding? In the slide below, the lighter shading represents 
local requirements, and the darker shading foreign customers’ requirements. So the 
situation is very good for Slovenia, Czech Republic and Estonia as the requirements 
of local and foreign clients are fairly similar. But in Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, it 
can be seen that domestic clients are not sufficiently demanding, resulting in pressure 
to provide higher quality products and services is much less. This highlights this 
problem of demand: the more specific the demand from local buyers the greater the 
scope for interactive learning and, according to ‘interactive dynamic capabilities 
approach’, this increases the probabilities of technology accumulation.  
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Quality of local vs. foreign demand for firms' 
products and services: 224 software firms in five CEECs
Demand constraints are significantly bigger in poorer countries
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33 Radošević S. (2006) 'Growth, Integration and Spillovers in the Central and East European 
Software Industry', UCL SSEES Working Paper No. 69, December, available at 
http://www.ssees.ac.uk/wp69sum.htm. 
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On a much higher level, the next slide shows figures from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) for levels of supply and demand for research, technology and 
development (RTD). And the slide after shows the indicators used to get averages of 
demand and supply for RTD. These are based on subjective data, but the large size of 
the WEF sample ensures some degree of objectivity. My interest is in the relative 
importance of factors of supply or demand for RTD. I draw attention to this to show 
that in all EE countries we see that the supply of RTD is ranked higher than demand. 
So EE has a major problem of weak demand for RTD.34  
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Factors of RTD: demand gap in EE
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Legend
• Suply
• Availability of scientists and engineers
• Quality of math and science education
• Local availability of specialized research and training services
• Quality of scientific research institutions
• Quality of public schools
• Quality of the educational system
•
• Demand
• Degree of customer orientation
• Firm-level technology absorption
• Buyer sophistication
• Production process sophistication
• Extent of staff training
• Capacity for innovation
• Company spending on research and development
• Government procurement of advanced technology products
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 For analysis of this approach in the context of South Eastern Europe see Radosevic S. 
(2009) ‘Research And Development and Competitiveness, and European Integration of 
South Eastern Europe’, Euro-Asia Studies, 61(4): 621-50. 
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 Pattern of integration into global 
industrial networks
 
 
I want to close this part of my lecture by examining how these countries become 
integrated in global industrial networks. This is important because the way that 
countries integrate into global economy is an important driver of growth. Here we 
have a situation which I think is typical of EE.  
 
 
 
Employment in high-medium tech manufacturing vs BERD/GDP 
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The above slide shows the share of employment in high and medium high tech 
manufacturing sectors on the x axis and business R&D on the y axis. I compare EE 
countries (in bold type) with other European countries. And when I look at the shares, 
I see Hungary, Oh, above 8 per cent share of employment in medium high tech 
sectors. Very good! And compared to Sweden, Sweden and Hungary have similar 
shares of employment in hi-tech manufacturing. Fantastic! So what is the problem? 
The problem emerges when you look at business expenditure on R&D in relation to 
GDP: then Hungary ranks very low, while Sweden shows a very high share of R&D 
in GDP. So what is going on? Well this suggests that EE countries are integrated in 
low value added segments in high tech sectors. So, they are in high tech sectors which 
should be a good basis for growth, especially for Hungary in electronics. But then, a 
Czech colleague, Martin Srholec, showed that the R&D intensity of Central Europe 
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countries’ electronics is lower than average manufacturing R&D intensity.35 So, there 
is participation in the electronics sector, but it is not actually R&D and technology 
intensive electronics. It is activity in a low value added segment of this high tech 
sector. So although this may be better than participation in a low tech, and is a way of 
participating in the global economy since countries have to start from somewhere, it 
sheds a light on the nature of EE integration. 
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Areas and sources of competitiveness
CEE-5
Quality 
control 
assistance
Management People and training
Patents, 
licences, 
R&D
Own company 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.50
Foreign parent 0.61 0.66 0.5 0.57
Other foreign buyers 0.55 0.35 0.29 0.31
Other foreign suppliers 0.51 0.3 0.26 0.3
Other local subsidaries 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16
Other local buyers 0.52 0.36 0.3 0.28
Other local suppliers 0.52 0.32 0.29 0.28
Other organisations 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.31
Production capability (quality): the key source of 
competitiveness …. confined  on subsidiary, parent company 
and value chain partners (suppliers, buyers) …..
Sample: 460 subsidiaries in 5 CE countries  
 
 
And the last piece of evidence here is from a project I was involved in, based on 460 
FDI subsidiaries in 5 EE countries. So these enterprises are the cream, because they 
are the subsidiaries of foreign firms. We asked them what was crucial for their 
competitiveness - quality, management, people training, or R&D? We also asked who 
were the most important actors for their activities – their foreign buyers, their foreign 
suppliers, their foreign subsidiaries, their local suppliers, their global suppliers, or 
other organizations. The figures in the slide above show the importance of these 
actors. What emerges from these data is that what matters for enterprises is what they 
are doing, what their foreign buyers are doing, what their buyers and suppliers are 
doing, and especially what they are doing in terms of quality. So, enterprises are 
dependent on their parent companies and their suppliers and want to please their 
buyers and this is the source of productivity improvements. Productivity 
improvements come from participation in a value chain that enables entry to the 
global economy; the firms involvement is still in terms of production capability and 
the quality.36 
                                                 
35 Srholec, M. (2006) ‘High-tech Sector in Central Europe: Is it a Real or Statistical Effect?’, in 
K. Piech and S. Radosevic (eds), The Knowledge-based Economy in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Countries and Industries in a Process of Change, London: Palgrave,pp. 57-78. 
36 Further on this see Majcen B., Radosevic S., Rojec M. (2009) ‘Nature and Determinants of 
Productivity Growth of Foreign Subsidiaries in Central and East European Countries’, 
Economic Systems, 33: 168-84 and Majcen B, Radosevic S. and Rojec M. (2006) ‘FDI 
Subsidiaries and Industrial Integration of Central Europe: Conceptual and Empirical 
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Systems of innovation and growth in  
CEE/CIS: a summary 
• Weak firm specific capabilities: a key weakness of NIS in EE
• Growth (so far) is based on production capability (i.e. on learning by 
doing and learning by interacting confined on value chain), not on 
technology capability
– Cf. FDI: direct effects are the most important; positive vertical spillovers; 
weak or negative horizontal spillovers
• R&D: not general shift towards BES 
• Global integration: CEEB > ‘network trade’ in low VA segments; CIS: 
still outside ‘network trade’
• ‘Broad’ NIS: local demand as one the key constraints
• Mismatches between and weaknesses in different NIS subsystems 
(BES, R&D system, FDI – local firms; large - SMEs) 
• Spurt: ‘static isolated competencies/capabilities’ => Catching up: 
dynamic interactive capabilities 
 
 
I would like to summarize my argument so far before moving to the political economy 
dimension - I am running out of time! So, what are my main points.  
 
First, it seems that weak firm specific capabilities are the key limitation in the 
innovation systems in EE. Growth so far has been based on production capability, 
which means it is based on ‘learning by doing’ and by interacting with buyers and 
suppliers, which in the main confirms what economists have found in econometric 
research on FDI – the results are compatible.37  
 
Second, it seems that in general, R&D has not shifted towards the BES – we see that 
R&D is still extramural to the enterprise, which is not a good sign for long-term 
growth. In terms of global integration, we see that countries are integrating in low 
value added segments, but through intra-firm networks, something that economists 
call ‘network trade’.  
 
Third, we find that one of the key constraints to technology upgrading is local demand, 
and especially quality of demand. 
 
Fourth, the logic of our conceptual model would suggest that growth emerges as a 
(mis)match between different social and economic subsystems, between the business 
sector and public R&D, between large firms and small and medium sized firms, 
between foreign and local firms, etc. So, ‘catching up’ as distinct from ‘growth spurts’ 
requires the development of ‘dynamic interactive capabilities’. A ‘growth spurt’ is 
characterized by weak individual learning mechanisms or by weak alignment between 
different learning mechanisms. As alignment takes place through both ‘pure markets’ 
                                                                                                                                            
Results’, in D.A. Dyker (ed.) Closing the East-West Productivity Gap: Foreign Direct 
Investment, Competitiveness and Public Policy, London: Imperial College Press, pp. 35-70 
37 Here I refer to econometric work on FDI spillovers which confirms the importance of 
vertical spillovers i.e links with buyers and suppliers and weak horizontal spillovers. For an 
overview of this literature see Jindra B. (2005) ‘Empirical Studies: Approaches, 
Methodological Problems and Findings’ in J. Stephan Technology Transfer via Foreign 
Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Palgrave – Macmillan, pp. 6-
57.  
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and networks and is heavily influenced by the institutional set-up, our approach 
remains basically one of systems of innovation. 
 
Now from an innovation studies point of view this could be the end of the story. But I 
am not happy with that.  
 
Political economy of technical 
modernization
- bringing control/power issues into the picture-
 
 
I want to introduce a political economy dimension. And I want to start with a 
particular kind of model. Consider two patterns of modernization - one ‘foreign led 
modernization’, which means that you quickly integrate in terms of market and 
production integration, you are open to FDI. What is the result? Rapid productivity 
improvements in production, in operations. For example, the productivity of 
Hungary’s subsidiaries is similar now to the productivity of Austrian firms. These 
productivity improvements are accompanied by significant expansion in volume. So, 
this growth emerges through exposure to global markets via FDI. That’s fine. But is 
there a downside? Trying to upgrade and expand within that network is not a trivial 
task; this is evident from actual case studies38. So, functional/technological upgrading 
is limited. Having achieved the level of a very profitable supplier it is difficult to 
move beyond this, because this represents the greatest demand. And, finally it is 
difficult for a subsidiary to change its mandate. In most cases, subsidiaries’ mandates 
do not change and local networking is limited. The overall result is high short and 
medium term growth, but potential structural weakness in the long term. 
 
                                                 
38 For example see: Denis Eylem Yoruk (2002) 'Patterns of Industrial Upgrading in the 
Clothing Industry in Poland and Romania', UCL Centre for the Study of Economic and 
Social Change in Europe: Working Papers No. 19, March, 
http://www.ssees.ac.uk/wp19sum.htm; Slavo Radosevic and Deniz Eylem Yoruk (2001) 
Videoton: The Growth of Enterprise Through Entrepreneurship and Network Alignment, 
UCL Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe: Working Papers No. 
3, June: http://www.ssees.ac.uk/wp3sum.htm  
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Modernisation trade offs
Foreign led
• Quick international market and production 
integration
• Fast productivity improvements in 
production (operations)
• Significant expansion in volume
vs.
• Reduced strategic autonomy
• Limited functional / technological 
upgrading
• Unchanged subsidiary mandate
• Limited local networking
• Fast growth in short term but potential 
structural weakness in a long term
Domestic led
• Broad strategic autonomy
• Full functional autonomy
• Local networking
• ‘Preserved’ NIS
vs.
• Limited international market and 
production integration
• Slow productivity improvements and low 
efficiency
• Slow expansion in volume
• Poor operational performance
• Potentially high rent seeking costs and 
‘waste’
• Slow productivity growth in short term but 
structurally potentially more advantageous 
situation 
 
 
 
Consider an alternative model, which I call ‘domestic led modernization’. Here you 
have broad strategic autonomy - because foreigners are kept at arm’s length. There is 
a full functional autonomy because all functions are still within the system. There are 
still local production networks or what has been preserved of these networks. And 
there is even a national innovation system – for example, in Russia, all the 
organizations of the national system of innovation are still there. Huge numbers of 
people are working there and you have the impression that everything is operating. Of 
course, if you delve more deeply you find that many of the organizations exist only in 
name or with significantly changed functions. This is a post soviet story that is full of 
interesting puzzles39. But, I would say that this is the good side to the story. So what 
are the downsides? There is limited international market and production integration, 
so the ‘learning by exporting’, ‘learning by cooperating’ with partners is to a very 
limited extent. There are slow productivity improvements and low efficiency, slow 
expansion in volume and poor operational performance. An example is the Russian 
automobile industry. The old production network has been preserved and is trying to 
produce a Russian automobile model that Russians will buy, but in an industry that 
effectively has been nationalized. So, this is the situation in domestic led 
modernization where we have potentially high rent seeking costs and ‘waste’ in the 
system. The overall result is slow productivity growth in the short term, but 
structurally and potentially the situation is more advantageous if modernization is 
achieved while keeping foreigners’ at arm’s length. 
                                                 
39 For excellent accounts of post-Soviet world and the role of informal networks see:  
Ledeneva,A.V. (2006), How Russia Really Works: Informal Practices in the 1990s.Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. And Ledeneva,A. (1998), Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, 
Networking, and Informal Exchange.Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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Inter country patterns of modernisation: 
outcomes of country/sector specific political economy
• Foreign led modernization in most of the sectors in 
central Europe (CE) vs. domestic led modernization in 
most sectors in European CIS (Russia, Ukraine) with 
eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria) being (temporary?) 
in an intermediate situation
• However, in none of the CEECs only one mode of 
modernisation dominates
• Pattern of modernisation is function of F, M, T gaps and 
institutional (political) factors > a co-evolution of 
technology and institutions
 
 
You will understand that I am hinting here at differences between Russia and central 
Europe. But the situation is not so simple. Of course there is foreign led 
modernization in most of the sectors in central Europe; there is domestic led 
modernization in most sectors in Russia and Ukraine, and Romania and Bulgaria are 
probably somewhere between. But we cannot say that one pattern of modernization 
dominates the other in any of the EE countries. This is because the pattern of 
modernization is determined by both political forces and the nature of the technology 
gaps, the market and the finance gaps. So, my argument is that the final outcome is 
the result of coupling or co-evolution of different gaps and institutions. What do I 
mean by this?  
 
I can use an example to make this clearer (see slide below). There are two sectors, one 
is software, which has a growing domestic market. Everyone needs computers and 
software. And in terms of finance – there is no large financial requirement for 
customized software. For example, a Polish entrepreneur can raise the money for an 
information and communication technology (ICT) venture from the stock market. So 
finance is not a major problem. Technology is not a problem because it is accessible 
through international cooperative agreements. Big ICT companies need local 
customizers and are willing to share their technology. So that is not an issue. So, two 
of three of the gaps are under control and the third gap can be bridged by trading 
technology for market access. As a result, there is a presence of domestic firms in 
sectors such as customized software, and elements of domestic led modernization. 
And this applies to all EE countries. 
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Software Telecoms
Markets 
(demand)
Growing domestic market; Growing domestic market
Finance No large finance required for 
customized SW; Finance as a 
problem in complex projects 
and standardized SW
Large finance requirement
Technology Technology accessible 
through ICA; Competitive 
advantages of domestic firms 
in customized SW; 
Technology gap in 
standardized SW
Huge technology gap in 
telecom equipment
Overall pattern A visible presence of domestic 
firms in customized SW
A strong presence of foreign 
network organisers
Foreign/domestic led modernisation is industry specific: 
barriers to entry
 
 
 
The second sector is telecoms, where there is also a growing market. People need 
telecommunication in the form of fixed and mobile telephones, etc. but here the 
financial requirements are large, and we are talking here of billions of euros, which it 
is not possible to raise in the domestic market. In addition, there has been a huge 
technology gap – sometimes 10-20 years. And the result  is a strong presence of 
foreigners which does not apply to all countries because there is still political 
resistance to surrender telecoms to foreigners in countries such as Slovenia where the 
technology gap is the smallest of all the EE countries, and Russia, which is 
sufficiently strong to at least bridge some of these gaps. So we have a picture of two 
patterns with technological, market and financial elements mixed up with political 
aspects. 
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Central Europe: tendency towards foreign led 
modernisation, except in Slovenia
• In all CE countries state actors tried actively to promote the 
emergence of a domestic ownership class (‘national 
capitalists’) by subsidizing the sale of state owned assets 
… results … meagre?
• All CE have eliminated obstacles to FDI (incl. Slovenia after 
1998)
• Strong external pressures for foreign led modernisation
• Constraints in terms of F, M and T have reduced 
bargaining power of the CE
 
 
The tendency, therefore, generally has been towards ‘foreign led modernization’ in 
central Europe. But we should remember that at the beginning of the 1990s, all central 
European countries tried to establish domestic control. For example, Hungary 
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proclaimed a policy to support 16 ‘national champions’. What was the result? Well, 
not much because the market, technology and finance gaps were too huge. We also 
need to consider the EU and the whole political context – strong external pressures for 
‘foreign led modernization’ - and constraints in terms of finance, markets and 
technology. 
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Russia: strong tendency towards domestic led 
modernisation
• Local political class has created opaque 
institutional environment which deter FDI
• Business groups have locked out foreign capital or 
have improved terms of their bargaining with 
foreign capital (1992-1999)
• ‘Thick’ local network which can ‘lock out’ 
investors…Foreign investors need locals to enter’  
(Lankes and Venables, 1997)
• A key bargaining strength of locals  is their “local 
knowledge” (Kock and Guillen, 2001; Henderson, forthcoming)
 
 
 
In Russia, the tendency is towards ‘domestic led modernization’. What happened in 
Russia during the 1990s was that the local political classes created an opaque 
institutional environment, which deterred FDI. In addition, it was in the interests of 
the domestic business class to make the local business environment non-transparent40. 
And this effectively ‘locked out’ foreign capital, which could not enter the local 
market without locals.41 So, this improved the bargaining terms with foreign investors.  
 
One of my PhD students is exploring this in the context of the Russian oil industry 
and is coming to the nice conclusion that the key bargaining strength of locals is their 
‘local knowledge’, because it makes foreigners dependent.42 
 
                                                 
40 On how specific institutional environment of Russia has affected its entrepreneurship see 
Aidis,R., Estrin,S., Mickiewicz,T. (2008). Institutions and Entrepreneurship Development 
in Russia: A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing 23, 656-672 
41 Lankes, H. P. and T Venables (1997) ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Transition: 
The Changing Pattern of Investment’, Economics of Transition 4(2): 331-47. 
42 Henderson J. (2009 forthcoming) ‘Bargaining with Foreign Investors in a Weak State 
Environment’, PhD thesis submission, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL.  
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Russia: From ‘market friendly’ towards 
‘heavy handed’ DLM
• Putin before Yukos: a more a ‘market friendly’ DLM
– 1999-2003: trend among large firms towards good corporate 
governance
• Putin after Yukos denotes a stage of ‘heavy hand’ DLM  
accompanied by strong industrial/technology policy
• Past political struggle in Russia could be interpreted as 
fight between DLM vs FLM .... 
– State re-imposes its control in gas, oil, aluminium, diamonds etc 
– Vs. Russians companies are ‘going global’ + pressures of growth 
and modernization (cf. Gazprom investments)
• 2004> state starts to dominate ? ……….
 
 
 
As the situation in Russia changes, one could argue that there is a shift from ‘market 
friendly’ towards heavy handed ‘domestic led modernization’. Putin before the Yukos 
affair could be described as more market friendly evidenced by the trend among large 
firms towards good corporate governance. After Yukos, we have a stage of ‘heavy 
handed’ domestic led modernization accompanied by strong industry and technology 
policy into which Russia is pouring billions of euros. So from this perspective, the 
political struggles in Russia can be interpreted as a fight between ‘domestic led’ and 
‘foreign led modernization’ through the imposition of control on gas, oil, aluminium, 
diamonds, and so on. But we should not forget that Russian companies also have to 
go global. This imposes limits on which domestic foreign led modernization pattern 
can be followed. Because eventually you need foreigners to bring technology, to co-
finance these huge projects. So, the question remains, as to what will be the role of the 
state? 
 
I want to conclude with two final slides. What I have tried to show you here is that 
growth within a system of innovation perspective is focused on these elements (see 
slide below): the mismatch between different systems; the variety of learning 
mechanisms on the supply and demand sides; and what is happening with capabilities 
at the level of enterprises. Of course, systematic application of what I have outlined 
would require in-depth country, industry and firm studies – it would require a whole 
project. And I hope I will be able to follow with that in the future. But what is it that 
makes current growth in EE look more like a spurt than catching up? From a systems 
of innovation perspective it is the missing learning mechanisms, and missing 
complementarities between them. The most important missing current 
complementarity is the coupling between domestic and foreign led modernization. 
Why – because there is no example of catching up in the world that has not combined 
these two patterns. They are combined in different ways – e.g. Japan and  Korea, but 
their coupling is indispensable. No country can grow based only on domestic 
capabilities. And there are limits to how much growth can be achieved based only on 
‘foreign led modernization’. So my argument is that each of these extremes will 
ensure medium term growth, but will soon be exhausted. The critical issue is how to 
realize the complementarities between these two patterns which will promote and not 
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undermine endogenous technological capability, which is essential to growth.  
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Conclusions and policy issues
• Growth in SI perspective: 
– favourable (mis)matching between different social subsystems 
(network alignment) 
– variety of learning mechanisms on supply and demand side
– enterprise: governance (cf. privatization) > capabilities
• A systematic application of this framework would require 
in depth country/industry/firm studies.
• What makes current growth to look more like spurt rather 
than catching up: missing learning mechanisms and 
complementarities? 
• The most important current complementarity is coupling 
between domestic and foreign led modernization
 
 
So why is coupling so difficult? It is difficult because it is about matching the 
different layers of integration – financial system, market system, production, 
technology – because these systems do not align automatically. This then proves the 
aptness of the phrase, that when we have catch-up it does not rain, it pours. This is 
why this process is not linear, it does not happen in marginal moves; it is non-linear 
and passes thresholds or critical points of alignment between different subsystems. 
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Catching up: complementarities between 
domestic (DLM) and foregn led modernisation
(FLM)
• DLM, which is based exclusively on domestic technologies and 
capabilities, has become increasingly unviable option
• FLM alone could ensure ‘spurts’ in growth but only coupling 
between FLM/DLM could ensure ‘catching up’
• The critical issue is how NIS manages complementarity between 
FLM and DLM so that it promotes rather than undermines 
endogenous technological capability
• Why coupling is difficult? Matching different layers of integration 
(finance, market, production, technology) does not emerge 
automatically = network failures > network alignment
 
 
In policy terms, we are talking about different types of actions: FDI for the value 
chain, and innovation policy focused on the national innovation system. In conceptual 
terms, the coupling between foreign and domestic led modernization would require a 
coupling between FDI/value chains and innovation or national system of innovation 
policy. 
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However, in practice these two policies are usually separate. You might describe it as 
one hand not knowing what the other is doing. FDI policy is divorced from other 
policies for national innovation systems. The latter are usually focused on R&D and 
high tech. What would that mean in the case of Estonia, for example? It would mean 
that the ‘audience’, the policy clients, would be only a handful of high-tech firms, 
with most firms outside its scope. Thus, there is a gap between the nature of 
innovation policy, which is high-tech/R&D oriented, and the actual path of 
technology upgrading in local firms. Also, innovation policy is not integrated with 
FDI policy. Yet, the coupling between foreign and domestic led modernization 
requires the integration of these two policy areas. This is essential to enhance the 
synergies, positive vertical and horizontal spillovers and interaction among local 
technology efforts and foreign technology and knowledge providers.   
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Key policy challenges
• Value chain vs. NIS: how to reconcile and integrate two 
policies?
– FDI: marketing country for FDI
– Innovation policy: exclusively R&D/high tech focus
• Russian industrial policy does not offer leverages or 
coupling with foreign capital; it is focused on large RTD 
projects which offer limited learning by interacting
• CEE: dangers of ‘surrogate modernisation’ of long 19th
century  + interaction with Structural Funds and with the 
EU core to enhance endogenous TC
 
 
In this context is Russia doing well? Well, Russian industrial policy is extremely 
strong in terms of the large sums being invested in various programmes – the smallest 
Russian programme is 400 million euros. Russia is investing in nano-technology 
similar amounts as is the EC. But Russia’s industrial policy does not enable leverage 
or coupling with foreign capital. It is focused on large RTD projects, but they offer 
limited ‘learning by interacting’. Its outcomes are mainly intermediate, such as papers, 
patents, models. This ‘big push’ policy may be not the most effective route as it does 
not enhance the coupling between foreign and domestic technology efforts.  
 
So where does central Europe stand? As I get older I read more history and this is 
showing me that we are seeing perhaps a repetition of something that Berend and 
Ranki43 describe in their account of so called ‘long 19th century’. This was a kind of 
transition period as countries moved from feudal to bourgeoisie systems. And there 
was an idea that institutional changes would be sufficient to modernize, i.e. there was 
process of ‘Europeanization’ of EE. Well we can see now that it was ‘superficial 
                                                 
43 Berend T.I. and Ranki,G. (1982) Industrialization and the European Periphery 1780-1914. 
Cambridge, New York. 
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modernization’ or modernization only in appearance. I think there are similar dangers 
today. There is a danger that everything will look like the developed EU (i.e. there 
will be strong institutional convergence), but the reality will be nothing like it. 
Therefore, what use these countries make of EU Structural Funds is very important. 
However, as in the past, what these countries do is not all that matters. What is also 
important is what the EU and what multinational firms do and how this interaction 
develops. This is happening now, and we can bear witness to the the successes and 
failures.  
 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
